Friday is a prospective student day and I will be giving a brief overview of the economics department in Briggs 217 at 2:10. I will be talking up our very solid curricular and co-curricular activities, including the Lawrence Scholars in Business program (video here), our Innovation and Entrepreneurship initiative(s), and the spectacular successes of many of our recent graduates.
And, of course, the Investment Club!
See you there.
When last we visited BP on June 3rd, it’s stock was down from $62 to$36 and appeared to be heading further south. Indeed, by the end of the month it had bottomed out at $27.05 and it was dark days both on the water and in the markets (unless you had shorted it, of course).
Well, six weeks later and things are looking up. The stock has risen back to $38, and even peeked its head about $40 recently. And, there are more and more stories, especially on the financial pages, that the magnitude of the environmental damages simply aren’t going to be as grotesque as anticipated. (Of course, this is not a consensus opinion).
So where does that leave the company’s fortunes? There are still momentous uncertainties about the environmental damages and liabilities, which could add to the stock’s volatility. But on the other hand, if the worst-case scenarios were internalized in the price, and those scenarios haven’t materialized,… this is why I buy index funds.
UPDATE: Evidently, the Financial Times is thinking about this, too.
If a firm wants to increase its revenues, should it raise its prices? The answer, of course, depends on the elasticity of demand for its product. If consumers are very responsive to price changes, a price increase could lead to lower revenues. Ack!
Now, if a government wants to increase it revenues, should it raise or lower tax rates? In this case, the answer depends on (among other things) how sensitive workers are to marginal tax rates. Arthur Laffer famously pointed out that it’s possible that taxes are so high that reducing them could induce people to work so much that lower tax rates could increase tax revenue.
The Laffer Curve rests on a simple conjecture — if tax rates are zero, then no tax revenue is generated. Well, that’s not a conjecture, that’s true. The conjecture is that if tax rates are 100%, then no one would bother to work because all wages would be absorbed into the government coffers. Because nobody would work, tax revenue would be zero.
Hence, we know two points of the Laffer curve — at tax rates of 0 and 100%. A key empirical question, then, is where does the Laffer Curve bend? The figure shows tax rates increasing along the horizontal axis leading to various levels of tax revenues on the vertical axis. The nice stylized version is symmetric with a nice revenue-maximizing peak, but there is no reason to believe the curve is symmetric (or even single peaked, really… at least I don’t think so). However, it is critical to know what the curve looks like so as to understand the likely implications of a tax increase or decrease. If we are to the right of C, an increase in tax rates will actually reduce tax revenues. Ack!
So where does it bend? The ever-energetic Ezra Klein surveys some of the giants of economics and policy folks in the know (the policy folks are mostly right of center) to get some answers. For those who are willing to proffer a number, that number is generally much higher than our highest marginal tax bracket. Tax guru Joel Slemrod, for example, is thinking its north of 60%.
Here are a couple of pithy responses:
Greg Mankiw: My guess is that that the short-run answer and the long-run answer are quite different. For example, if you raised the top rate from 35 to, say, 60 percent, you might raise revenue in the short run. Over time, however, you would get lower economic growth, so the additional revenues would fall off and eventually decline below what they would have been at the lower rate…. I will pass on offering a specific number, as it would require more time and thought than I can offer just now, but I will opine that I think the long-run answer is actually more important for policy purposes than the short-run answer.
Martin Feldstein: Why look for the rate that maximizes revenue? As the tax rate rises, the “deadweight loss” (real loss to the economy rises) so as the rate gets close to maximizing revenue the loss to the economy exceeds the gain in revenue…. I dislike budget deficits as much as anyone else. But would I really want to give up say $1 billion of GDP in order to reduce the deficit by $100 million? No. National income is a goal in itself. That is what drives consumption and our standard of living.
Short run, long run, deadweight losses.
Good stuff!
Recently, Andrew Grove (former CEO of Intel) and a number of policy makers have claimed that we need to keep our manufacturing sector vibrant as a way to sustain national economic security. In today’s Financial Times, Columbia University economist, and perennial Nobel Prize candidate, Jagdish Bhagwati contests that claim, and notes that we already subsidize American manufacturing in many ways. Furthermore, he argues that such efforts have not been good value nor have they been the best way to increase employment or innovation. He concludes as follows:
“In policy, sometimes Gresham’s Law operates – with bad policies driving away good ones. With no good argument in its favour, a preoccupation with manufacturing industries threatens yet one more example of such a perverse outcome. By promoting manufacturing of all kinds (as can be expected as the sector’s lobbies get down to work) at the expense of more innovative and dynamic service sectors, precisely when America is faltering in its recovery from the crisis, this unhelpful fascination promises to inflict gratuitous damage on an economy that can ill afford new wounds.”
Some interesting interviews for those of you out cleaning the garage this weekend.
The first is Raghu Rajan, a favorite of Professor Finkler (I’m guessing from this link), in a Vox interview, “Fault lines: how hidden fractures still threaten the world economy.” From the abstract:
Raghuram Rajan of the University of Chicago talks to Romesh Vaitilingam about his new book Fault Lines, in which he outlines the deep systemic problems in the world economy that threaten further financial crises – high US inequality, patched over by easy credit; excessive stimulus to sustain job creation in times of downturn; and the choices of Germany, Japan, and China to focus on export-led growth rather than domestic consumption. The interview was recorded in London in July 2010.
The second is a favorite of mine, Political Scientist David Brady, over at EconTalk.
David Brady of Stanford University talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the state of the electorate and what current and past political science have to say about the upcoming midterm elections. Drawing on his own survey work and that of others, Brady uses current opinion polls to predict a range of likely outcomes in the House and Senate in November. He then discusses the role of recent health care legislation in the upcoming election as well as Obama’s approval ratings. The conversation concludes with Brady’s assessment of how Congress might deal with the demographic challenge facing entitlement programs.
Brady has a good sense of politics and political history, in addition to being an excellent social scientist. In my policy making institutions course at Carnegie Mellon, I used Brady & Volden’s Revolving Gridlock as an introduction to a simple spatial model and an overview of the past 40 years of American politics (Just don’t tell Professor Hixon).
And, I buried the lead here. Laurie Santos talks about monkey decision making over at TED. Who knew monkeys were so irrational? She does some monkey experiments and finds that monkeys consistently make the types of “irrational” errors that humans make.
Laurie Santos looks for the roots of human irrationality by watching the way our primate relatives make decisions. A clever series of experiments in “monkeynomics” shows that some of the silly choices we make, monkeys make too.
I coined the tag “monkeynomics,” not realizing that there actually was monkeynomics. Click on the tag for more monkey business.
Given the information in the statement, I would call it a “Capital Loss” special. Nothing has been said about what happened to the general level of prices or about the purchasing power of the asset. Without such information, one can say nothing very interesting about the change in the price of one specific asset. It’s certainly possible that the price of an asset (call it shares of Lehman or Enron stock) can fall with or without inflation or deflation. I can’t tell what the purpose of the example is; hence, as Professor Gerard points out, Planet Money needs help.
They may need as much help as the US Senate who rejected Fed Board of Governor’s nominee Peter Diamond because he allegedly was not a macroeconomist.
Ah, those discerning folks who man our legislature.
There’s a peculiar piece in The Atlantic about peculiar behavior of robot traders.
As usual, I have no idea what these robots are up to, but it probably isn’t about making me rich. The picture shows “an extreme closeup of just one second of trading of the stock SHG, the Shinhan Financial Group. This is 760 quotes from a total of 10,000 made in 12 seconds.”
Now, why would a robot do that? There’s no telling with these robot traders.
My suggestion is to take these pictures and ask Professor Azzi.
I bet he has an explanation.
Fill in the blank:
ADAM DAVIDSON: Ladies and gentlemen, I have an amazing investment opportunity for you. Give me $100 – just a hundred – and in one year, I promise it will be worth 93 bucks. We call it the _______ special.
Okay, what’s your answer?
If you said “inflation,” congratulations, you’ve mastered one of the simplest concepts about the value of a currency. As the general price level goes up, the purchasing power of the currency goes down. In this case, the $100 you lent is worth only $93 when you get it back. That’s why in times of inflation, people are reluctant to lend money.
If you said “deflation,” congratulations, you’re the co-host of NPR’s Planet Money. And that bit of Econ 120 fail is from a “patented Planet Money explainer.” Yikes. There was an entire story yesterday written around this bit of confusion.
Let me ask you a question — is that enough to knock that program off of your trusted sources list? They ostensibly write about economic issues, yet neither the founder/writer nor any editor/producer was able to catch such a colossal blunder. If they are that confused about the easy stuff, how much do you trust them to explain credit default swaps or the toxic assets program? (And, as regular readers know, we love the Toxie Cam).
Must be that solar eruption.
Economist Steven Landsburg recently argued that economics can be summarized in two words “incentives matter.” He further noted that “all else is commentary.” Tim Harford, author of The Undercover Economist, argues in today’s Financial Times that he accepts the notion that incentives matter, but “the devil is in the details.” He chides himself and other economists (as well as bankers and policy makers) for not understanding the painful relevance of such detail. In short, forewarned should mean forearmed.
In today’s Financial Times, John Kay crafts a Shakespearean characterization of recent life on Wall Street. See if you recognize all of the characters. If you want the details, read (or listen to) Andrew Ross Sorkin’s Too Big to Fail. This one definitely falls in the “tragedy” category.
By John Kay
Published: August 3 2010 23:20 | Last updated: August 3 2010 23:20
King Sandy: a little known tragedy, comedy and history in five acts, by William Shakesdown. Based on ‘King of Capital: Sandy Weill and the Making of Citigroup’, a story by Amey Stone and Mike Brewster
Act I. Brooklyn. A dead tree stands to the right of a tumbledown brownstone house. The Brooklyn Bridge and the skyscrapers of Wall Street are in the background. Three witches greet the young boy standing on the front steps.
“All hail to thee, that shall be boss of Shearson,” says one.
“All hail to thee, that shall be leader of Travelers,” says another.
“All hail to thee, that shall be King of Wall Street, thereafter,” says the third.
Young Sandy, shaken, ponders the implications as the curtain falls.
Act II. Manhattan. Sandy, his belongings in a bundle on a stick, crosses the Brooklyn Bridge to seek his fortune. He starts as a shoe-shine boy but his talent is quickly recognised and he becomes chief counsellor to the land of Shearson. He forges an alliance with the duchy of Amex, ruled by the patrician John Robinson. But the Duke resents the clever, uncultured, grasping Sandy and sends him into exile. “There is a world elsewhere,” Sandy proclaims.
Act III. Baltimore. Sandy and his brilliant lieutenant, Jamie, plot their comeback. Building a band of faithful Travelers, Sandy and Jamie move step by step towards Wall Street, finally storming the bastions of Salomon and Smith Barney.
Act IV. Washington and Manhattan. The triumphant Sandy is in a tent outside Washington. The omnipotent King John, Lord of the Citi, enters. Sandy and John agree to unite their kingdoms. Back in Manhattan, Sandy exiles the now too powerful Jamie, assassinates King John, and is proclaimed King of Wall Street.
In the final scene, the fool Grubman is seen playing his fife all the way up Manhattan from Wall Street. Followed by an admiring crowd, he distributes parcels of fool’s gold and internet magic.
Act V. Manhattan and Washington. The fool is exposed: his parcels are empty. He is banished. King Sandy, his reputation tarnished, is deposed. Under the regency of the Chuck Prince, the Citi is riven by competing baronies. The land of Lehman is pillaged by its own citizens. Barons mob the Court, shouting: “Where are our bonuses?”
The situation is calmed by the arrival of Barack the Great, newly elected emperor. His counsellors, Bernanke and Geithner, are at the head of a long train bearing all the treasures of the Americas. The barons break open the chests and rush off with the treasure. Jamie, returned from exile in Chicago, is crowned new King of Wall Street.
***
At the medieval courts Shakespeare described, the exercise of power was not a means to an end, it was itself the end. Kings and barons sought principally to extend their territory. If they occasionally claimed that the purpose was to bring the benefits of their wise rule to a wider public, the assertion was little more than a smokescreen for personal ambition. The rulers aimed to be exalted as rulers of wider domains and to levy taxes on ever more peasants. The political and economic environment has been transformed. But human nature has not, and the factors that drive powerful men today are little different from those that drove them five centuries ago.
The fine robes of Shakespeare’s princely characters were paid for by the work of the peasantry, the men and women who tilled the fields and garnered the crops. Their labours yielded revenues to support lifestyles entirely disconnected from their own experience, people who knew nothing of agriculture and cared less, and whose activities were sometimes disruptive to day-to-day economic activity but mostly irrelevant. Once there were sowers and reapers, now there are bank clients and factory workers; once there were palaces and carriages, now there are McMansions and private jets. Much has changed, yet much remains the same.
Craig Pirrong, the Streetwise Professor, believes cocoa prices are fixed. Why does he believe this? The data, of course.
Here’s the scoop:
The basic result is that the July, 2010 price rose about 6 percent more than one would have predicted, given the movements in the September, November, and July ICE prices… This rise in the relative price of July cocoa is exactly what you would expect to observe during a corner, and given the typical co-movements of all these prices, are highly unlikely to have occurred by chance in a competitive market.
If you read his post, which I recommend you do, you can see he developed a fairly straightforward methodology for inferring some sort of market manipulation in an earlier paper on soybeans.
Of course, I learned about price fixing from the frozen orange juice pits in Trading Places.
Not terribly long ago we linked to an Art Devany article where he claimed that the steroid era had no statistically discernible effects on home run production. Eric Gould and Todd Kaplan look carefully at the numbers and determine that Jose Canseco had a big influence on his peers’ performance numbers.
From the abstract:
[W]e estimate whether Jose Canseco, one of the best baseball players in the last few decades, affected the performance of his teammates. In his autobiography, Canseco claims that he improved the productivity of his teammates by introducing them to steroids. Using panel data on baseball players, we show that a player’s performance increases significantly after they played with Jose Canseco. After checking 30 comparable players from the same era, we find that no other baseball player produced a similar effect. Clearly, Jose Canseco had an unusual influence on the productivity of his peers.
If you are a baseball fan, this is a nice research paper to take a look at. The problem identification is clear, the statistical analysis is straightforward, and the interpretation of the coefficients is central to the analysis. In other words, it isn’t enough to be statistically significant, it also must be “economically” meaningful.
Here, the evidence shows that power hitters substantially boosted their home run production after playing with Canseco, to the tune of almost three dingers per yer. That’s both statistically significant and has “baseball” meaning. (Similar results did not hold for fielding prowess). The more convincing piece is that there are no other sluggers where this result holds. That is, if the Canseco result was some statistical fluke, you would expect a similar result in at least one other player.
Still, I am going to talk to Prof. Finkler, because I don’t think the numbers are quite consistent.
Here’s a nice summary at Slate.
And here’s Mr. Canseco’s tell-all, Juiced. When this came out, it was scandalous and the denials were ubiquitous. But, as time marches on, several allegations have come to pass, and few have been discarded. By the way, that’s the famous “ball bouncing off Canseco’s head and over the fence for a home run” picture, run ad nauseum on sports bloopers back in the day.
A couple of final words on the summer I&E Reading Group selection, Moneyball. As was argued by Michael Lewis, Billy Beane capitalized by exploiting what appeared to be a market inefficiency. Indeed, economists Jahn Hakes and Skip Sauer found empirical support for this proposition .
An interesting question, then, is why other teams didn’t innovate via these quantitative techniques sooner? In an archived EconTalk interview with Professor Sauer, Russ Roberts suggests that Major League Baseball may well not be a competitive industry. That is, owners are “playing a different game” and that the costs of having a bad team aren’t really that high. In fact, Roberts argues (at about 28:00), the absence of competition would allow owners can indulge stupid management practices without a significant hit to the bottom line. It would also allow teams to do things like discriminate on the basis of race, or simply not aggressively try to win, where the costs would not be that high. When is the last time a team went bankrupt? Or sold at a steep discount?
That’s an interesting point because a standard economics argument is that competitive markets are quick to punish firms that fail to adopt best practices. Firm that adopt racist or sexist hiring or compensatory practices will loses out to those that don’t. And the larger point, of course, is that robust competition pushes firms to innovate, or at least to adopt practices once others have done so. In the context of baseball this is transparent. When there was a color line and African Americans were excluded, then teams didn’t suffer for their racist practices. However, once teams started to sign the best African Americans players, then racist policies had a price; that is, teams that didn’t discriminate on the basis of race had access to the best African-American ballplayers — refusing to sign Willie Mays doesn’t help your chances of winning.
Sauer also addresses Steve Levitt’s criticisms (which I share) about the source of the A’s dominance was actually their dominant starting pitchers (at about 38:00). Sauer responds that, regardless of the reason for the A’s success, the numbers seem to show an inefficiency on the offensive side.
You can also catch Roberts interviewing Michael Lewis on the topic of Moneyball.
David Leonhardt has set the kindergarten teachers’ portion of the internet afire with his provocative New York Times piece, “The Case for $320,000 Kindergarten Teachers.” He cites some recent research that finds unusual importance of the kindergarten year to adult outcomes, and in particular the importance of good teachers.
Students who had learned much more in kindergarten were more likely to go to college than students with otherwise similar backgrounds. Students who learned more were also less likely to become single parents. As adults, they were more likely to be saving for retirement. Perhaps most striking, they were earning more.
Mr. Chetty and his colleagues estimate that a standout kindergarten teacher is worth about $320,000 a year. That’s the present value of the additional money that a full class of students can expect to earn over their careers. This estimate doesn’t take into account social gains, like better health and less crime..
That $320,000 figure is what has set the internets ablaze with kindergarten teacher good cheer, along with the usual trenchant observations about the pay disparity between teachers and, say, professional athletes. One would expect a economics blog post to go through the caveats of demand and supply setting wages, problems identifying good teachers and firing bad teachers, and these sorts of issues.
I was thinking along different lines. In the past two weeks, our Innovation & Entrepreneurship Reading Group has been thinking about the Moneyball Hypothesis and how it might apply to higher education. For example, what sort of metrics might we incorporate to identify promising collegiate talent? Here’s a thought — rather than relying on SAT and ACT scores for admissions, why not require kindergarten transcripts? This could easily be accomplished by simply asking for all school transcripts instead of relying on the high school transcript. If Chetty and company are right, this could be just the route to go to identify some of those diamonds in the rough.
Also see The Economist‘s brief writeup.
UPDATE: It looks like graduate schools have beaten me to it.
For those of you who wish to see a response to Rajan’s (and my) argument posted earlier today, Paul Krugman in a NY Times blogpost makes the standard Keynesian case for full fledged stimulus. He even criticizes our hero Schumpeter. The battlelines are drawn between short term and long term thinking.
Macroeconomic stabilization policy seems to have only two primary levers: interest rates and budget deficits. Many economists believe that we have used these tools to the limit and have not faced the structural changes (read microeconomic) our economy requires. A cheap credit policy has fueled much of the growth of the past 25 years and especially in the past decade. Consequently, when income generation becomes insufficient to pay the related debt service, our fragile economy stumbles. We cannot continue to revert to cheap credit as the way to stable growth.
Raghu Rajan, in both an opinion piece in today’s Financial Times and in his marvelous book, Fault Lines, argues that ultra low rates (in both nominal and real terms) encourage allocation of capital into housing and cars but do little to help sustain long term economic growth. In Chapter One of Fault Lines, entitled “Let Them Eat Credit”, Rajan claims that United States policy makers (of all stripes) have used cheap credit as a way to assist low and moderate income groups with consumption to mask the growing income gap between these groups and higher income groups. Abundant savings from Asia in particular, as a response to IMF conditionality in the financial crisis of the late 1990s, has enabled the US to pursue such a low rate policy. If Asians follow our advice and dramatically increase domestic consumption, the low rate policy will not be sustainable and the weaknesses our economy will become more evident.
Don Boudreaux at Cafe Hayek argues persuasively that energy independence and comparative advantage are not likely to be compatible for the U.S. If we wish to specialize in energy production, it will be more expensive in terms of economic welfare than importation; thus, we must either accept a lower standard of living or import something else. What makes energy so special that we should not trade for it? Should we instead import more food, pharmaceuticals, or technology, for example. In short, the doctrine of comparative advantage suggests that we specialize in things that we are particularly adept at producing and trade for other goods and services.
In his classroom talk in April, Yoram Bauman posed two questions
1. Are you fearful that we will run out of energy (especially from carbon based sources)?
2. Are you fearful that we will not run out of energy from carbon-based sources?
Higher prices can ensure that the first won’t happen but not the second. Concerns raised by positive answers to the second question won’t be addressed until we have a price for carbon-based energy that is higher than for clean fuels. Certainly, energy independence (i.e., no importation of carbon-based fuels) will lead to higher prices, but it also would be a very expensive way to achieve the result as the domestic price would have to rise enough to clear the domestic market. It’s not clear, however, that this would be a price that internalizes the greenhouse gas effect.
While we’re on the topic of the publishing industry, my insider contact has tipped me off to the latest delicious controversy. Literary superagent Andrew Wylie is taking his clients’ backlist titles and selling the e-book rights directly and exclusively to Amazon.
Wow. I wonder what that means?
Let’s take a step back. Suppose you are, say, John Updike, and Random House wants to publish your book. The company gives you an advance and then pays you royalties based on sales and all things are right in the world.
But now, technology marches on and the next thing you know the Kindle and the iPad emerge, and all of a sudden there is a potentially new version of your product, the e-book. What should we make of this? Does your contract with Random House extend to the right to publish the e-book? Or do they have exclusive rights to Or do you maintain that right?
It wasn’t until the mid-1990s that Random House began explicitly covering e-books in its contracts, and Wylie seems to think that his clients maintain e-book rights. The courts seem to agree.
It’s not clear from the article that that is the biggest problem. According to the New York Times blurb:
John Sargent, chief executive of Macmillan, posted a response on his company’s Web site, criticizing Mr. Wylie for cutting an exclusive deal with Amazon for the 20 e-books, which in addition to Mr. Nabokov’s “Lolita” and Mr. Roth’s “Portnoy’s Complaint” include Ralph Ellison’s “Invisible Man” and John Updike’s “Rabbit” books.
“It is an extraordinarily bad deal for writers, illustrators, publishers, other booksellers and for anyone who believes that books should be as widely available as possible,” Mr. Sargent said.
Some of you may remember Mr. Sargent who locked horns with Amazon not too long ago over rights to set prices for e-book prices. The effect of that was for Macmilian and others to wrestle control from Amazon and raise consumer prices for many e-book titles. Certainly, at least in terms of a partial equilibrium model, the higher prices aren’t consistent with “as widely available as possible.”
It’s probably more complicated than that, though.
The Summer marches on, and that means it’s time for some more summer reading. My recommendation this week is from George Mason economist and Marginal Revolution blogger extraordinaire, Tyler Cowen. His latest book is The Age of the Infovore.
So, I was poised to pick up a copy for my wife at Amazon for what seemed to be a bargain price of $10.88, but then noticed that the hardcover version, Create Your Own Economy, was selling for only $4.64. It’s the same book, but the title changed when the paperback edition was released.
But then I thought, maybe she’d want the Kindle version instead. But the Kindle edition of Create Your Own Economy is $12.99, whereas the Kindle for The Age of the Inforvore is $9.99. Huh. So I’m paying a premium for a Kindle version of a hardcover version of the book, but I enjoy a steep discount if I actually purchase the hardcover.
Then I thought, well, maybe I’ll get her some perfume.
I think Yoram Bauman is right – choices are bad.
UPDATE: I sent this pricing info to Professor Cowen and he sent me a copy of his book with the inscription, “How is $0.00 for a price?” Thanks!
UPDATE 2: While trolling the EconTalk archives, I came across an episode of Roberts and Cowen talking about the book.
During the recent oil price spike in 2008, one of my mates suggested that our generation will be the last to enjoy relative ease in air travel. A large number of people, even those with decidedly middle class incomes, have the means to travel extensively and find their way to every nook and cranny the world has to offer. A sustained oil crunch, absent a viable fuel substitute, could indeed cripple the airline industry and leave globetrotting to the relatively affluent.
Taking it a step further, Brian Ladd extends the thought experiment to automotive travel. I’m not sure I endorse his argument, but I certainly like the thought experiment. One passage pertaining to industrial production caught my eye:
Economists who blithely assume that pre-2008 automobile sales are “normal,” because Americans “need” their cars, misunderstand the nature of the automobile market. Enormous cars, long commutes, and vast parking lots do have their advantages, but we could manage to live without them.
I am inclined to think that economists would be the last group to assume such a thing based on “need.” In fact, I would think that we would be in the opposite camp, arguing that price signals will lead to adjustments both on the demand side (fewer miles, more fuel-efficient vehicles, shorter commutes, maybe even public transportation) and the supply side (improved fuel efficiency, alternate fuel source).
For an excellent discussion, I recommend the classic James Hamilton blog post on “How to Talk to an Economist about Peak Oil.” I’ll go through that in a future post.
